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BOOK REVIEW
The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court. By Bob
Woodward and Scott Armstrong. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1979 Pp. 444.
Earl Warren, the Chief Justice of the United States,
hailed the elevator operator as if he were campaigning,
stepped in and rode to the basement of the Supreme
Court Building, where the Court limousine was waiting.
Warren easily guided his bulky 6-foot-l-inch, 220 pound
frame into the back seat. Though he was seventy-seven,
the Chief still had great stamina and resilience.

Opening paragraph of THE BRETHREN
I.

AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEDITATION

My father is what is known as a "popular historian." He
reconstructs events by means of research. He fleshes out
characterization and dialogue as necessary, extrapolating from the
documentation he has generated. He is therefore both scholar and
writer, as concerned with style, structure, tension, mood, and flow
as he is with accuracy of detail and fidelity to events. He started out
as a journalist, more specifically a sports correspondent for a
Hungarian newspaper, eventually becoming a war correspondent, a
feature journalist, and a world traveler when the world was substantially larger than it is now. Instead of bedtime stories, I would
hear about safaris to Africa, about scorpions in slippers and brushes
with malaria, about forays into Ethiopia (nee Abyssinia) and Israel
(nee Palestine). The first birthday present I can remember was a toy
typewriter. By the time I was five I had a real one; I could type
before I could read.
Instead of jokes my father would tell me tales redolent with a
newsman's bragadoccio and a Hungarian's affinity for wild hyperbole. The best story, he would vow, is the story that you make up
yourself, because it's three stories, not just one: the story, the
response, and the retraction. Best of all, it's exclusive.
I care for my father with a passion that matches his own enthusiasm about everything in his life. I was raised to believe, and do
believe, in the validity of popular history as a literary form. Telling
a good story is as important as telling a true one.
More often than not, the villains of my adolescence were the
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stodgy academics who would be called on to review my father's
latest work. Whenever a new book would come out, the reviews
would come in. The New York Times, the only paper that really
matters when you come right down to it, would always feel obliged
to ask a historian to review my father's books. And if there is anything that professional historians hate, it is popular history.
It is, after all, the popular historians who write the best sellers,
who make all the money, who get the glory, and who (it must be admitted) occasionally are responsible for widely held misconceptions
and oversimplifications. And it is the serious history scholars who
write nitpicking, niggling critical essays inflated with selfimportance and a need to demonstrate superior knowledge; essays
which, with depressing regularity, include no more than an
obligatory paragraph about the book-the actual product of the
years of effort, research, toil, and love-hidden amid pages of hoohah about the reviewer's own particular scholarly interests.
As you can see, it's hard to shake impressions gleaned in
childhood.
Quick cut forward. The time is the present. I am, I shudder to
say, an academic. I try to maintain my sense of humor about this
fact, but sometimes (late at night and on odd occasions) that can be
difficult to do. More particularly, I am a lawyer-academic, an administrator of a law school. Like every other lawyer in this country, I
am fascinated by the Supreme Court. Like every other lawyer in
this country I had an immediate and Pavlovian response to the word
that Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong were turning their attention to the inner workings of that inner sanctum.
The story broke with the fanfare of a Kennedy wedding. Sixty
Minutes, Newsweek, Harry Wellington waxing eloquent on the Today
show. It became immediately evident that there were no major
revelations to be had, but that, almost as good, there were lots of
pieces of great judicial gossip.
Now, I am something of a jurisprudential prude. I don't deny a
certain gut interest in the gossip, but I worry about the integrity of
the institution. I'm part of a generation of lawyers for whom Perry
Mason was mother's milk and who were weaned on the daring
statesmanship of the Warren Court. I am terrified of the possibility
that the man on the street will learn that the justices of the United
States Supreme Court have feet, calves, legs (let's be frank here,
whole torsos-that's probably why they wear those robes) of clay. I
am, in the depths of my cowardly soul, willing to ignore the
mediocrity of Warren Burger, indeed beatify him by association
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol14/iss3/7
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with his judicial brethren, if that is the price that must be paid in
order to grant Earl Warren a similar immunity from criticism. I'll
let you have yours, if you'll let me have mine.
All of this autobiography has a point. It explains why, when I
got set to read and review The Brethren, I was primed to dislike it,
to take it apart for what it was striving to do, to dismember it in
theory, no matter how good it turned out to be in practice. I was all
set to write a piece of jurisprudence, to repudiate the vestiges of
legal realism that Woodstrong would conjure up. And it explains the
cynical sinking epiphany I experienced when I opened the book,
read the first paragraph, and realized that they had written a work
of popular history and that I was all revved up to play stodgy
academic.
Mirabile dictu, it turns out that The Brethren is indeed a bit of
popular history, but it's a thoroughly shoddy piece of work. It is bad
law, worse journalism. It is boring, poorly written, sketchily researched, and ill-conceived. What I thought might be jurisprudential
dynamite doesn't even pack the wallop of a cherry bomb. So you will
pardon my schizophrenia, and permit me to exorcize some personal
demons by explaining why, whatever else it may be in theory, in
practice The Brethren is a lousy example of popular history. And
then (and only then) I'll deliver the academic sermon, whose coda is
that we shouldn't know, shouldn't even want to know, the details of
the personal lives of the justices of the Supreme Court.

II.

A CRITICAL EXEGESIS

You are probably not reading this review unless you already
know a good bit about Woodstrong's efforts. You know that The
Brethren is a book about the evolution of the Burger Court. That its
authors are investigative journalists from the Washington Post (one
of whom was mythologized in the film All The President's
Men-Woodward is the one played by Robert Redford). That they
have spoken with actual Supreme Court justices; that they purport
to have had access to the private journal of at least one of them;
that they have "sources" from deep within the judicial chambers.
You probably have also heard all the titillating stories: Justice
Douglas was incontinent,' Chief Justice Burger is a martinet,'
1. Not only that, but the other Justices didn't like the way he smelled. See
B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 391-92
(1979).
2. Woodstrong portray him as both humorless and vindictive. They suggest,
for example, that he was not at all amused by a Christmas skit that Rehnquist approved
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Justice Rehnquist is a clown.3 And you have probably read some of
the extensive criticism of the book that has already appeared, including deftly-wrought hatchet jobs in The New York Times,' The
New York Review of Books,5 and The New Republic.'
Much of the criticism is dead on target. In fact the only sort of
criticism that I have seen thus far with which I would disagree
relates to the function of popular history and the nature of a journalist's sources. The Brethren is written for a general audience, for
non-lawyers as well as attorneys. The Justices speak, they think,
they feel. In trying to convey these facts of judicial life, Woodstrong
put words in the mouths of the justices, thoughts into their heads.7 I
do not doubt for a moment that all of this reconstruction is precisely
that, an attempt to generate a whole portrait by the accretion of
individual strokes. The critical test is not whether any one stroke is
accurate, indeed none of them need be perfectly right. Rather, it is
whether the finished product, taken as a whole, bears a faithful
resemblance to the model.
Undoubtedly there are errors in the authors' research. They
almost certainly must ascribe thoughts to people who never said
them. It may well be that they have even botched some of the
chronology of the broad sweep of their story. For those of us concerned with a close reading of a particular decision, these sorts of
error may well invalidate the contribution of the book. But The
Brethren was not written for academics, and it is not fair to judge
it, at least initially, as though it were.
The real question is whether Woodstrong do a good, or even a
serviceable, job of making a narrow patch of recent history come
alive. Does the accumulation of all their little lies add up to a large
truth? Do we know the institution, or the men who comprise it, any
better when we finish the book than we did when we began it?
which took
Rehnquist's
Id. at 412.
3.
412-13.
4.
5.
3.
6.
at 30.
7.

the judicial selection process somewhat lightly, and that this resulted in
being denied any significant opinions on the subsequent assignment sheet.
Rehnquist is apparently the life of all the Court's parties. Id at 269-70,
Adler, Book Review: The Brethren, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1979, § 7, at 1.
Lewis, Supreme Court Confidentia4 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 7, 1980, at
Hughes, Book Review: The Brethren, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 23, 1980,
B.

WOODWARD &
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These are the terms on which the book may be fairly judged, and it
is on these terms that the book, initially, crucially, and ultimately,
fails.
There are many reasons why this is so. On the most mechanical
level, it is woodenly written and egregiously edited. Woodstrong
must bear the responsibility for the first half of that deficiency, one
which is highlighted by their regular criticism of the prose style of
the various justices! Legal writing, after all, is rarely felicitous.
Clarity is the prime desideratum, and it is a sad fact of intellectual
life that clarity may often be bought at the expense of grace. Works
that emerge from the end of a committee drafting process (such as
that used by the Court) are particularly poor samples of an individual's style.
On the other hand, prose technique is at the heart of the
popular historian's craft. While I don't care whether a Supreme
Court opinion is gripping, it is critically important that a book like
The Brethren be well wrought. And, sad to say, this book is just the
opposite. The language is simplistic and monotonous. There are frequent grammatical lapses, including a remarkable preference for
particularly awkward split infinitives Transitions are often arbitrary,
as though the mere addition of a conjunction suffices to yoke two
totally distinct events together."0 Many descriptions are so over-long
that they become 12tedious." All in all, the book reads like an ambitious first draft.
This unfinished quality strongly suggests that the book's editor
was asleep at the switch. In general the book evidences an extraordinary lack of care by the publisher. Bad editing has allowed grammatical errors to make their way into print, wordy passages to remain
untouched, and the odd transitions to be left in as inexplicable
monuments to a lack of concern for the flow of the manuscript.
Underscoring all of this is a thoroughly shoddy typesetting job.
8. Woodstrong manage to criticize a Blackmun dissent as overwritten, in the
middle of a paragraph of their own which is virtually incomprehensible. Id at 362.
9. See, e.g., id. at 119 ("to never again"), 129 ("[t]o not utter"), 424 ("to effectively withdraw").
10. See, e.g., id. at 184 and 362.
11. The Watergate Tapes section is interminable. Id at 285-347.
12. There are also various minor errors of fact that should have been corrected by a copy editor (or, for that matter, any law student). Thus, for example, they
refer to the University of California at Berkeley's law school as Boalt Law School, id.
at 240, and to Yale's law review as the Yale Law School Journal, id. at 443.
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Admittedly each of these concerns is petty. But they are meant
as expressions of a more significant underlying point. Woodward
and Armstrong are journalists with little experience at writing the
sort of sustained narrative required by a book. The medium for
which they regularly write anticipates and expects strong editorial
involvement. The Brethren suffers for want of that sort of stylistic
and organizational help.
But these problems merely mar the surface luster of the book.
The more fundamental difficulty lies in the way Woodstrong researched and developed their work. It is not merely the narrator's
voice that is monotonous. The characterizations are no less flat and
lifeless. Later I will explain why I agree with many of the book's
critics that it is tragically wrong to be concerned with the personalities of Supreme Court justices. But for now let us assume that
that is an appropriate end, and the one that the authors here are
seeking. They miss by a mile. The problem appears to be a combination of simplistic prose style and poor research. Human beings are
caricatured, their motivation is rarely illuminated.
Good journalism is not necessarily "objective," but it is never
intrusive. Facts, rather than judgments, are presented. If a point is
made, a writer's prejudices expressed, these emerge from the selection and organization of the facts, not from an internal polemic. But
Woodstrong work the other way. Time and again they judge their
own material, draw their own conclusions, insult the intelligence and
objectivity of their readers by assuming that the story cannot speak
for itself.
Warren Burger, for example, emerges as a stuffy, stupid, selfimpressed individual, obsessed with controlling the process of the
court even to the exclusion of standing up for his own rigidly conservative principles. 3 It is a portrait drawn with the subtlety and
sensitivity of Mister Bluster on the Howdy Doody Show. Woodstrong's Burger is simply not a believable human being. Indeed,
none of the justices emerge with plausibly complex identities.'
We are assuming that we want to know about the private lives
of the justices, that we are interested in their personalities and ec13. The authors note several occasions on which he would join an otherwise
unanimous majority, in order to appear in control. See id at 53, 136-39, 414-20. They
also suggest that he would occasionally withhold his own vote or change his mind in
order to control case assignment. See, e.g., id. at 178-81, 417-22.
14. This is particularly disappointing with respect to Justice Douglas after his
retirement. The Woodstrong account makes him appear to be a pathetic old man, totally
without human dignity. See, e.g., id at 433.
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centricities. Presumably, then, we are legal realists, intrigued by the
justices' breakfast menus as a way of understanding their judicial
decisions. But if we really want to understand, rather than indignantly criticize, the men who make up the Court, then we need to
find authors who are capable of getting beneath the surface of their
cast of characters, who can make us understand why Warren Burger
votes as he does, why William Douglas adored the wilderness, why
William Brennan is a civil libertarian. We will want, if we are to be
fair to these men, to understand the subtle shadings of their personalities.
Why don't we get these insights from The Brethren? Because
the authors are willing to settle for less and because they sought (or
were limited to) a peculiarly narrow range of informants. They
spoke to the justices, to their recent clerks, to some of the people
who work in the Court.15 They did not speak to wives and children,
friends, relatives, rivals, co-workers. Each of the justices they write
about had lived full lives before they were appointed to the Court.
Even Douglas, appointed when he was younger than any of the rest
of the group, was forty when he was tapped. But Woodstrong
haven't touched that material, they tell us nothing about the
justices' lives.
It may be argued that the authors didn't wish to invade the
personal privacy of the men they profiled. But that is hardly tenable
in a book which revels in the violation of confidence and the exposure of personal tastes and attitudes. How much worse would it
be to reveal some of the Chief Justice's family life, than to detail his
hatred for his former colleague David Bazelon? 6
Well, then, perhaps it may be said that this is not a personal
history, but a political one. The idea is not to dramatize the lives of
fourteen individuals, but to capture somehow the independent life of
an institution. Such a claim is also unsuccessful. The life of the institution may speak for itself, in the voice of its published opinions.
Or it may be explicated by a complex understanding of the way in
which individual personas contribute to the corporate acts of the
group. Either of these would be defensible. But Woodstrong give us
neither, presenting instead something in the middle, something
wholly unsatisfactory.
They expose the squabbles, assuming that these somehow are
an important institutional characteristic. But they seem satisfied to
15.
16.

Id. at 4.
See, e.g., id. at 22-23.
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reveal them without understanding them. It might well be that
judges' decisions depend crucially on their breakfast menus. That
would not mean, however, that there would ever be a market for a
collection of the daily menus of a particular judge. Whatever insight
there is in the "realist" claim, it has little to do with the food, and
everything to do with the judge's attitude towards the food. So the
book of menus would be of little help unless we also had a
remarkably detailed and sensitive personal profile of the individual
involved.
If we accept this book on its own terms, then, we are forced to
believe that Woodstrong should have dug deeper, done more (not
less) character reconstruction. The opening paragraph holds out the
promise of a book that will do this. The image of Earl Warren, the
old campaigner, is a striking and an insightful one. It is, sadly,
perhaps the only intriguing personal insight in the book. The
strength of popular history is that it makes the events come alive, it
makes historical characters seem to be real, fallible, vulnerable, complex. To do this it must take liberties that scholarly history cannot
afford, but it also reaps the benefit of a visceral understanding to
which scholarly history rarely aspires. Woodward and Armstrong
take the risks but relinquish the benefit.
As I have already suggested, I suspect that this problem
derives as much from the nature of the sources they were able to
generate as it does from the authors' own shortcomings. Woodward
and Armstrong seem to have mined a mother lode of Supreme Court
clerks. Others have noted that this leads to a peculiarly pro-clerk attitude in their understanding of the court. Clerks' roles loom somewhat larger than life; their influence on the justices seems blown
out of proportion." Perhaps the most telling aspect of this is that
the clerks never come in for the kind of criticism that the justices
do. Clerks are often quoted as ridiculing a justice. 8 Not once is the
work of a clerk criticized in the book."
These are certainly serious problems. They suggest not only
that Woodstrong are unfortunately accepting of whatever their
sources tell them, but that they have a disturbing naivete about the
17. Thus, the clerks are accorded a more impressive understanding of the role
of the. Court than Justice Blackmun. Id at 120-21. And they are given the credit for
virtually all of Justice Marshall's work. See, e.g., id. at 258-59.
18. For example, in the thoughts that Woodstrong attribute to one of Blackmun's clerks, one of Blackmun's opinions is "crudely written and poorly organized." Id
at 183.
19. Indeed, Justice Douglas is castigated by the authors when he treats a
woman clerk brusquely. Id. at 240-44.
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actual workings of a court. Supreme Court clerks serve for a year.
They live in a world populated primarily by research and books and
secondarily by interactions with their fellow clerks. Their contact
with justices is often slight. It is almost universally highly formalized
even at its most recreational. The clerks are, quite simply, the worst
possible source of material about the internal psychology of the
justices. Of course, there are exceptions to this rule, but they are
rare, and for the most part clerks know roughly as much about their
judges as artists know about their patrons.
Once again, I acknowledge that this concern may seem a rather
small one. Certainly, it is possible that there are limitations to
Woodstrong's sources. But there are always limitations to any effort
to capture human endeavor in words. Aren't we better off for having this insight into the clerks' point of view than we would have
been had the authors left the topic alone? On one level, of course,
we are. And a book about the clerks'-eye-view of the Court would be
an interesting and a novel one.' Such a book would require considerably more attention to the personae of the clerks than The
Brethren offers, however. Indeed, Woodward and Armstrong seem
to assume that their sources should function as more or less omnipotent third person narrators. The clerks comment on the action, occasionally participate in it, more frequently report on it and criticize
it, but they have no names, no personalities, no preferences, tastes,
eccentricities or predilections of their own.
So the clerks are everywhere while remaining themselves invisible. Even this, in itself, is no great crime. But I want to suggest
a real difficulty which may be far more disturbing. The treatment of
the clerks is only one symptom of it. I'm concerned that the entire
organization of the book may be undermined, the view of history it
presents distorted, by the skewed research sample available to the
authors. Thus, the clerks' perspective is presented as gospel, leading
us to wonder whether the big picture for Woodstrong is defined as
being whatever picture it is that they have the palette to paint.
They had the clerks as sources, so it is only the clerks' story that is
put forward as the truth. This suspicion, if supported by other
evidence, must undermine our evaluation of the entire enterprise.
And there is indeed supporting evidence available, even to a casual
reader with little insight into the working of the Court.
Recall that Woodward's own history is rather tightly bound up
20. The closest thing to such a work treads so softly that it provides little if
any insigAt into the workings of the Court. See J. WILKINSON, SERVING JUSTICE: A
SUPREME COURT CLERK'S VIEW (1974).
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with Watergate, that he had developed an impressive collection of
material on all aspects of that trauma, and that he has an unusually
strong interest in it. Given that this is the case, let us ask whether, objectively, the Watergate Tapes case merits roughly fifteen percent of
this book's pages.21 To place that in perspective, the book covers the
entire case load of seven years of the Court's work in roughly 420
pages. Sixty-two of these are given over to the single Watergate tapes
case. The entire 1974 Term merits thirty-eight pages. Indeed, only
two of the six non-Watergate terms merit more pages than that
single case, and all the non-Watergate cases of the 1973 Term merit
an aggregate of ten pages.
There is still more evidence that the very foundation of the
book is lopsided, favoring cases where the authors had material and
disfavoring equally important cases where they seem to have little if
any. I was particularly interested to see how they treated the
DeFunis case." Of course, that case was, at least potentially, among
the most divisive that the Court heard during the period covered by
Woodstrong. Furthermore, since Bakke3 postdates the period of
their concern, DeFunis was the single case in which the Court addressed reverse discrimination directly. Contemporary events make
it evident that the Court has yet to articulate a clear set of holdings
in that area, and a reading of the individual justices' attitudes would
be particularly helpful.
These, however, are all the concerns of an academic lawyer. I
also had a voyeuristic curiosity about the case. The Court had
granted certiorari in DeFunis,2' but during the 1973 Term it dismissed
the case as moot. 5 This action was bizarre, since the case had
already been argued and there was nothing new at the time of the
dismissal. Marco DeFunis was in fact well on his way to graduating
from the school which had originally rejected him, but that had been
true also at the time certiorari was initially granted. Nevertheless,
the justices voted to dismiss the case without addressing any of the
problems it raised. Only Justice Douglas came to terms with the
merits of the case."' And, in a highly unusual dissent to this sort of
dismissal, four justices pointed out the incongruity of the Court's action."
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
senting).

B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 285-347.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
414 U.S. 1038 (1974).
416 U.S. 312 (1974).
1I at 320.
Id. at 348 (Brennan, J., Douglas, J., White, J., and Marshall, J., dis-
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This is precisely the sort of situation which piques the interest
of an outsider looking in. What sorts of internal horsetrading had
gone on first to grant certiorari then to deny it? What role did Douglas
play? Why did the Court refuse to decide that case, and how was
that decision reached? These are the sort of questions that The
Brethren seems to wallow in. Endless pages are devoted to descriptions of early drafts,28 vote switching,29 internal negotiations," and,
particularly, the use of a threatened dissent by a single justice as a
lever to move the Court to action.' But DeFunis rates less than a
page." The questions it raised are not even identified, much less
answered. It is impossible to avoid speculation that Woodstrong
simply did not have the goods in this instance, and therefore ignored the importance of the case.
Taken together, these separate symptoms-the over-reliance
on clerks as sources, the extended discussion of the Tapes case, and
the disturbing avoidance of DeFunis-suggest that the book is riddled
with a pervasive and dangerous disease. The authors write about
the things that they were able to generate material about. History
is rewritten on the basis of research coincidence. This lack of
perspective, if my speculation is correct, necessarily undermines the
book so severely that I wonder whether it merits the term nonfiction at all.
I am sensitive to the charge that I am here lapsing into my
academic -garb, that this criticism is unfair when applied to a work
of popular, rather than scholarly, history. But I must protest. It
would certainly be unfair to lodge these complaints against any individual aspect of the book. I suggested at the outset that the
criterion to be applied should not ask whether each individual
stroke was perfect, but rather should determine whether the overall
portrait presents an acceptable likeness. And it is emphatically the
overall likeness with which I am concerned. I don't honestly care
whether Woodstrong skipped DeFunis; they might have many
legitimate reasons for doing so. I am, however, fearful that the problems I have identified all suggest a systematic distortion of reality
28. The lengthy Watergate Tapes discussion takes the reader through every
incarnation that opinion ever saw. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at
310-47 passim.
29. See, e.g., the discussion of the Court's vascillation on the Donaldson rightto-treatment case. Id. at 372-83.
30. Again, the Watergate Tapes case goes into tremendous detail about the
internal wranglings of the justices. Id. at 310-47.
31. See, e.g., threats by Black and Brennan. Id. at 42-55, 438-42.
32. Id. at 282.
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to serve the convenience of the authors. And the result, I am very
much afraid, may not capture the likeness of the real workings of
the Court at all.
III.

A

JURISPRUDENTIAL HOMILY

I have not thus far discussed what I think is the most telling
criticism of The Brethren. In addition to being rather badly done, it
is, quite simply, boring. This is an idiosyncratic response. Others
may find it exciting. There was a time not very long ago when I
found law school faculty meetings exciting. I came to my current job
directly out of law school, and I brought with me the law student's
paranoid belief that faculty consciously conspire in their meetings. I
assumed, that is, a uniformity of purpose in the policies that emerged.
I suspected that there were unarticulated principles at work, that
personal pettiness was rampant, that anti-student sentiment ran
deep.
It turns out, of course, that some of my assumptions were correct. But, to my surprise, that doesn't make them interesting. The
more you know about the inner manipulations of a deliberative
social decision-making mechanism, the less interesting its deliberations beome. And, by now, almost two years after my first taste of
the academic apple, I have long since learned that you can become
tired of virtually any new flavor after a vei'y short period of time.
Indeed, I can think of only one thing that I would find less interesting than participating in a faculty meeting, and that is reading
the transcript of one. Which brings me back to the subject at hand.
This is not, I think, a matter of taste, but of jurisprudence.
Just as the reliance on clerks as sources was a symptom of the
book's distortion of history, the fact of its tedium is a symptom of an
important underlying insight. The Brethren is boring because the
legal realists were wrong. The law is not a function of judicial peccadillos, and this is made manifest when we tire of reading about
the quirks of Supreme Court justices. The machinations that lead up
to judicial opinions fail to illuminate those opinions in precisely the
way that legislative history fails to provide any real insight into the
principles that make up the foundation of the law.' Those principles
energize the law in a way that Woodstrong's chronicle of judicial bitchiness never can.
33. See Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, 26 N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS,
Dec. 20, 1979, p. 37 at IV. A concern with principles rather than personalities is
generally articulated by Ronald Dworkin. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977) (see especially ch. 4).
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The sociology of judicial decision-making has its devotees. It
has its insights and its truths. I certainly would not want to claim
that the process revealed by Woodward and Armstrong does not in
practice generate the law we discuss in theory. But it is a process
that looks very much like the deliberation of any group of nine picky
persons distanced rather substantially from the impact of their decisions. And if it demonstrates anything about the relation of judicial
personality to ultimate outcome, it suggests most strongly that the
psychological and interpersonal variables are too numerous ever to
be captured before the fact. Furthermore, once a decision is articulated it takes on a life of its own. The important sociological and
psychological events are not the ones that relate to the court which
reached the decision in the last case. Rather, they are the ones pertaining to the next court, the court that will interpret the opinion in
the future. Thus, we cannot use our psychological and sociological insights to predict outcomes, and the outcomes have an impact by no
means determined by those insights. So why should we be interested in them at all?
My answer is that we should not be interested in them, and indeed we are not interested in them except as novelties. Our major
interest is in witnessing the unmasking of the Court as the clock
strikes twelve, at looking behind the screen to see what the Wizard
really looks like. And perhaps this demythologizing has a salutary
effect. But I am very concerned that it does not, that in fact it may
undermine the good that the Court actually accomplishes. After all,
Frank Baum had the wisdom not to end the Wizard of Oz with the
unmasking of the Wizard. He had the depth of understanding to
know that myth serves important human functions, that the citizens
of Oz were better off with their wizard than without, humbug or no.
And he gave his characters the compassion and the faith to accept
the Wizard's magic as real even after their rude awakening.
Because, after all, he did make it possible for the lion to discover his
courage, for the woodman to find his heart, and for the scarecrow to
become conscious of his brain.
I am more cynical than Baum, and less trusting of the general
reader than he was of the children for whom he wrote. I don't know
how many of us retain the innocence necessary to breathe life back
into our legal fictions even after we have attended their rather
gruesome autopsy. And I am particularly troubled by a book such as
The Brethren which seems to embody the opposite of Baum's theme:
Roust the humbugs out! Ridicule them! Don't trust them! Recognize
that they are no different from the rest of us, humble, fallible mor-
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tals. A message like this makes it difficult for even the most
trusting of us ever to accept the authority of the Court again.
The Supreme Court plays a vital part in our lives as lawyers. It
is a black box that generates law. We put fact patterns in at one
end and we get opinions out the other. The opinions can then be
spun back into the seamless web of the law. 4 We need this black
box because of the necessary limitations of our legal system.
Legislatures can never totally avoid ambiguity, no workable theory
of the law can seriously hope to close all of its gaps. 5 Uncertainty of
substance is, I think, a necessary, even a welcome, part of the law.
But no legal system can tolerate uncertainty of outcome. Whatever
the initial substance of the law, mechanisms must exist which derive
unambiguous outcomes for every case.3
The question necessarily arises, if the substance of the law is
uncertain, from where does a court derive its authority? And it is
this question that the mystery of the Supreme Court addresses. We
can accept the fallibility of the entire judicial system, we can
observe its mundane origins and we can decry the human failings of
its membership. But we can do so only so long as we accept the
ultimate authority of the system. We can do so only so long as we
believe that, taken as a whole, it works more justice than injustice,
it does more good than harm. And our belief in the system as a
whole may be condensed into a belief simply in the authority of the
apex of the pyramid. To trust the motives of the judiciary as a
whole we need only trust the motives of the court of final review. In
this sense, our trust in the authority of law is directly tied to our
belief in the wisdom of the Supreme Court.
That belief is of course a fiction. Nevertheless, we do our best
to perpetuate it. We do so because it is such an important fiction, so
fundamental to our acceptance of all the rest of the social fabric.
Our distance from the Court helps us to perpetuate the myth. So do
the ritual trappings with which the Court is invested. The Court's
tradition of written opinions, and the secrecy in which its deliberations have been cloaked also contribute to our ability to accept the
members of the Court as more than judges. They are justices, the
personification of fairness itself.
34. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
35. I try to demonstrate this point in considerably greater detail in Farago,
Intractable Cases, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. __
(1980) (forthcoming). See also Farago,
Judicial Cybernetics: The Effects of Self-Reference in Dworkin's Rights Thesis, 14
VAL. U.L. REV. 371 (1980).
36. Farago, Intractable Cases, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. __
(1980) (forthcoming).
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The mythology bf the Court is one aspect of our mutual trust
of the legal system, and it is therefore part of the price we pay for
our social bond. When that mythology is taken away from us, the
bond is weakened and the system may begin to unravel. This might
all be regrettably necessary if the knowledge we gained were
somehow important or valuable. But that knowledge is useless. It
tells us little about how the Court has acted and less about how it
will act. Not only does it not help us to understand the political principles on which our law is based, it actually diverts our attention
away from those principles, and urges us to believe that the law as
explicated by the Supreme Court is somehow merely a function of
the foibles of nine not very appealing individuals.
The Supreme Court is not like any other part of our legal
system. It is not a political mechanism, even though it may act
politically and even though its membership may be appointed by
politicians. It bears the same relation to the rest of the polity that
H.L.A. Hart's "rule of recognition" bears to all other legal rules." It
is an ultimate justificatory force, and so must be autonomous and
self-validating. We may of course disagree with the Court's holdings
and interpretations at any given time. We may criticize its opinions
and propose alternatives we feel are better. But we cannot distrust
the Court without distrusting the entire system, for it is the Court
that functions to keep everything else honest; when it is decisively
challenged it will take everything else with it. There may come a
time when this is necessary, when we will want to look scrupulously
into the affairs of the justices and the way in which they make their
decisions and exercise their power. But all that Woodward and Armstrong have demonstrated is that that time has not yet come. Their
research, if evaluated with a sensitivity for the role of the Court in
the society, should have led them inexorably to the conclusion that
there was no book to be written here. It is a profound pity that they
lacked that sensitivity, a pity which is ironically redeemed in part
by the fact that they also lacked the skill to do the job well.
John M. Farago*
37. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-107 (1961).
*Assistant Dean, Valparaiso University School of Law.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980

